Ivan tar pengene sine ut av banken:
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Det er interessant at ukrainerne ser ut til å ha sluttet å oppgi hvilke landsbyer de har gjenerobret. Jeg lurer på om målet er å ikke utfordre de flott fargelagte kartene som Putin og generalstaben hans ser på.
Uavhengige osint gir sine analyser, men jeg tviler litt på at den russiske generalstaben ønsker å dra noe oppmerksomhet til uavhengige kart.
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It will take months—not weeks—to repair the extensive damage to the primary distillation units at the Orsk refinery. [1]
While minor strikes on storage tanks or pumping infrastructure can often be bypassed or patched in a couple of weeks, destroying all four core atmospheric-vacuum distillation (AVT) towers creates a structural crisis
The Orsk refinery has a nominal processing capacity of roughly 5.76 to 6.6 million metric tons of crude per year (about 115,000 barrels per day). In 2024, it was responsible for producing 1.8 million tons of diesel and 600,000 tons of gasoline.
Ganske mye kapasitet som nå altså er offline i mange måneder. Dette er ikke av de største anleggene, men skaden er altså total.
Gjorde som sagt litt undersøkelser rundt utviklingen for russisk raffinering og det ser virkelig ille ut. Dette illustrerer hvordan.
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Krigsspill utført i Tyskland mellom US og UKR. Ukrainerne vant:
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Spent på hva USA bidrar med her:
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Oppdatering fra ISW for de interesserte:
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Det kom en ganske god forklaring på dette.
Russerene internt i eget forsvarsbyråkrati lyver og lyver for å karre til seg mest mulig ressurser.
Vet å oppgi så lite informasjon som mulig så er det flere lag med ledere som ikke vet at russiske stillinger er mistet og tatt over av Ukraina.
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Det reduserer forhåpentligvis antallet glidebomber som lander på de fremste stillingene.
Glidebomber brukes mest mot større mål, da de er notorisk unøyaktige.
Byer, store militære områder.
Enkeltstillinger not soo mutch.
Men det viktigste er at det ikke sendes forsterkninger til områder som tapes til ukrainere fordi militær ledelse lengre opp i systemet ikke får informasjon.
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Det er dessverre ikke bare Ukraina som jakter logistikk
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Det ser dessverre mørkt ut med Patriot -luftforsvar
Og Putin sater på å drepe flest mulig -sivile eller ikke sivile
Trump bryr seg ikke så mye om dette som han av og til later som han gjør
Ukrainerne må nok satse mye på å produsere luftforsvar selv
Patriot er dessuten altfor kostbart til å være levedyktig under en utmattelseskrig
Quote from Zelenskyy: "This year we have two and a half times fewer interceptors than we had in 2025.
Russia has two times more ballistic missiles per month than they had before."
Quote from CNN: “July was the deadliest month for Ukrainian civilians since April 2022, according to the United Nations.”
Quote from Zelenskyy: “Each night [we] have attacks, and four or five times per month we have massive attacks … terrible nights.”
“Very heroic, very resilient [Ukrainian] people really. But they [are] tired.”
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Russia will likely continue to rely on its use of a relatively small number of jet-powered Geran drones in its nightly strikes against Ukraine until Ukraine can develop sufficient countermeasures and the technological offense-defense race resets. Ukraine’s GUR told Ukrainian military outlet Militarnyi on August 12 that Russia produces about 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 jet-powered strike drones per month at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in the Republic of Tatarstan and at other Russian defense industrial enterprises.[19] The GUR added that Russia seeks to expand its production capacity at the Alabuga SEZ, with Militaryi noting that satellite imagery captured in early July 2026 showed ongoing construction at the enterprises that began in May 2026.[20] The GUR stated that Russia halted its production of Geran-3 drones, a jet-powered adaptation of the Geran-2 equipped with a Kometa-M12 anti-jamming navigation system, in line with recent statements from GUR Deputy Head Major General Vadym Skibitskyi that Russia is focusing production on Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones.[21] The GUR noted that Russian forces are increasing their use of Geran-4 and Geran-5 drones in their strike packages due to the drones’ technical abilities that allow them to penetrate Ukrainian air defenses. The GUR stated that Russia has stockpiled about 6,200 Geran-type drones for future strikes against Ukraine as of August 2026.[22] The GUR added that Russia’s limited production capacity does not permit Russia to sustain repeated strike packages with very large numbers of drones, noting that Russian forces now typically launch 150 to 300 Geran drones per strike package as Russia builds up its stockpiles — as opposed to very large salvoes of 600 to 1,000 drones that have characterized Russian strike packages in early 2026.
Russia may be able to reduce the number of drones it launches nightly as it shifts towards using more powerful jet-powered drones that Ukraine struggles to intercept. Russia is also currently focusing on its use of ballistic missiles to take advantage of Ukraine’s lack of anti-ballistic interceptors, and Russia does not require large numbers of drones to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses to allow the ballistic missiles to penetrate and strike their targets.[23] Russia may transition to larger drone packages in the future, however, in an attempt to again overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses once Ukraine develops sufficient countermeasures to intercept the jet-powered drones at a high rate. The dynamic between Russian drone production and Ukrainian interception innovations is exemplary of the offense-defense cycle of innovation and adaptation that has characterized the technical dimension of the war thus far.
Kort sagt: Russland har en relativt høy produksjon av jet-drevne droner som er vanskeligere for Ukraina å skyte ned.
Fikk chatgpt til å lage en liste på raffinerier med mer enn 3m tonn/året i kapasitet. 4 av disse har ikke blitt angrepet i 2026.
| Rank | Refinery | Operator | Approx. capacity Mt/y | Latest reported attack | Latest publicly reported status |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Omsk | Gazprom Neft | ~22.0 | 6 Jul 2026 | Halted after attack |
| 2 | Kirishi (KINEF) | Surgutneftegas | ~20.0 | Jul 2026 | Halted; had been shut since 5 May |
| 3 | Ryazan | Rosneft | 17.1 | 29 Jul 2026 | Processing suspended |
| 4 | Nizhny Novgorod (NORSI) | Lukoil | ~17.0 | 2026 attacks | Partial/variable; exact current run rate not reliably public |
| 5 | TANECO, Nizhnekamsk | Tatneft | ~17.0 | 10 Aug 2026 | Damage reported; exact operating rate unclear |
| 6 | Yaroslavl (YANOS) | Slavneft | ~15.0 | 6 Aug 2026 | Fire after attack; exact processing rate unclear |
| 7 | Volgograd | Lukoil | ~14.5 | 2026 | Repeated disruptions; exact current rate unclear |
| 8 | Perm | Lukoil | ~13.0 | 29 Jul 2026 | Damage reported; exact current rate unclear |
| 9 | Moscow | Gazprom Neft | ~10.8–13.4 | 18 Jun 2026 | Offline; repairs estimated ≥6 months |
| 10 | Tuapse | Rosneft | ~11–12 | 2026 | Repeatedly disrupted; exact current rate unclear |
| 11 | Angarsk | Rosneft | ~10.0 | No recent confirmed strike | No publicly reported major outage found |
| 12 | Salavat | Gazprom Neftekhim | ~10.0 | 14 Jul 2026 | Halted after attack, according to industry sources |
| 13 | Komsomolsk | Rosneft | ~8–10 | No recent confirmed strike | No publicly reported major outage found |
| 14 | Syzran | Rosneft | ~8.5 | 8 Aug 2026 | Had been suspended; latest post-attack rate unclear |
| 15 | Novokuibyshevsk | Rosneft | ~8.5 | 18 Apr 2026 | Primary processing halted in latest detailed report |
| 16 | Ufa / Novoil | Bashneft/Rosneft | ~7 | 2026 | Disruptions reported; exact rate unclear |
| 17 | Ufaneftekhim | Bashneft/Rosneft | ~7 | 2026 | Disruptions reported; exact rate unclear |
| 18 | Saratov | Rosneft | ~7 | 2 Aug 2026 | Processing stopped after attack |
| 19 | Achinsk | Rosneft | ~7 | No recent confirmed strike | Operating; fuel was being redirected from Siberia |
| 20 | Kuibyshev (Samara) | Rosneft | ~7 | 10 Jun 2026 | Processing halted after damage to both main CDU units |
| 21 | Afipsky | Safmar | ~6.5–9 | 14 Jul 2026 | Fire/damage reported; exact rate unclear |
| 22 | Ilsky | KNGK | >6 | 8 Aug 2026 | Fire after attack; exact rate unclear |
| 23 | Orsknefteorgsintez | ForteInvest | 5.76–6.0 | 11 Aug 2026 | Halted; repairs could take up to six months |
| 24 | Khabarovsk | NNК | ~5.5 | No recent confirmed strike | No publicly reported major outage found |
| 25 | Slavyansk | Slavyansk ECO | ~4.5–5 | 2026 | Disruptions reported; exact rate unclear |
| 26 | Ukhta | Lukoil | ~3.0–4.0 | 2026 | Disruptions reported; exact rate unclear |
For nytt til at det ble tatt med:
Ser at Salavat står som “Halted” fra før av. Antar Ukraina ikke hadde giddet å angripe det hvis det faktisk var Halted.
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Produksjonsanlegget i Alabuga er svært stort. De har kjørt store kampanjer i Afrikanske land rettet mot unge kvinnelige arbeidere. Jeg tipper at luftvernet rundt anlegget er godt, siden produksjonen der er viktig for Russland.
Avstanden til frontlinjen i Ukraina er omkring 1200 km. Det er fint innenfor rekkevidden til flamingo, men trolig i lengste laget for avledningsdroner som vil behøves i stort antall for å få igjennom noen flamingoer.
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Russiske tap sist døgn inkluderer:
** 1.310 soldater
** 474 kjøretøy
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Pluss en fra den russiske marinen.
Ukrainerne har klart å plassere ut ei bombe på et sted de ventet at han ville passere, og detonert den uten å ta livet av andre.
Virker som om de har en del agenter i Sevastopol.
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UKR eksporterer droner til USA:
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