Episk artikkel fra 2016 
2 Likes
Snakk om dobbeltmoral! Men det visste vi jo fra før…
2 Likes
Håndverkerne/byggebransjen i Norge kan komme til å slite:
Ikke rart når prisene er som de er at folk gjør det de kan selv.
Fikset nylig på huset og sammenliknet med snekkers tilbud tjente jeg 4500 pr ettermiddag på å ta det selv. Man er også nøyere når man gjør det selv.
4 Likes
Ser ut som OBXen kommer til å åpne ned?
US Futtene falt ganske bra i natt men har hentet seg noe inn. Smitten ser ut til å øke i US og Sør-Amerika 
Resultatet etter BLM-demonstrasjonene begynner nå å titte frem:
1 Like
Analytiker: Nedgang i vente på Oslo Børs
Roger Berntsen, analytiker i Nordnet, tror Oslo Børs åpner ned 1,2 prosent mandag morgen.
– Det ble registrert over 30.000 nye Covid-19 smittede i USA fredag. Dette er det høyeste tallet siden tidlig mai. Tross økningen i smittetallene forholdt investorene seg relativt rolige, skriver Berntsen.
Han legger til at det ligger i kortene at flere vil bli smittet av koronaviruset, men at det avgjørende er at smittespredningen ikke kommer ut av kontroll.
– Det var knyttet stor spenning til børsene i Asia mandag på grunn av de siste dagers smitteøkning i Nord- og Sør-Amerika. Investorene lot seg for øvrig ikke skremme slik de tidligere har gjort, fortsetter han.
1 Like
S&P futures dannet bearflag. Veldig lavt volum på den pumpen:
OBXen åpner som forventet ned, trenger brudd på 715 for å trigge HSen:
2 Likes
Har FED begynt å trappe ned kjøpene? Ref. grafen jeg postet sist uke. Trenden bekreftes her:
Futtene var ned -1,5% i natt vertfall… Så Hild må ha ringt en venn over there.
Neida. Det er bare det som dere har vært vitne til hele tiden. FED vil jobbe mot dere 24/7. Og som jeg har sagt lenger opp jeg tror bjørnene taper som de pleier gjøre når motstanderen er FED. 
Blir spennende å se neste datapunkt fra balance sheet.
Kan tyde på at kjøpene trappes kraftig ned nå.
Potensiell wedge i olja:
1 Like
For å si det sånn, det kan hende du har rett, men FED har gjort dette i lang tid. Sist gang for å støtte banksystemet. Jeg står i fare for å gjenta meg selv her, men dette er ikke systemisk grådighet vi er vitne til og dermed er det litt utenfor FEDs kontroll rundt hva utfallet kan bli. De kan ikke pumpe i evigheten uten å ødelegge det de prøver å redde.
This time is different…
by Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff
Princeton University Press © 2009
496 pages
When You Hear “This Time Is Different,” Don’t Walk, Run
Every few decades, the economy’s major players develop bulletproof confidence in the
efficiency of markets and the health of the economy. Known as “this-time-is-different
syndrome,” this unrealistic optimism afflicted bankers, investors and policy makers
before the 1930s Great Depression, the 1980s Third World debt crisis, the 1990s Asian
and Latin American meltdowns, and the major 2008-2009 global downturn. Conditions
differed, but the same mindset – a dangerous mix of hubris, euphoria and amnesia – led
to each of these collapses.
In each case, decision makers adopted beliefs that defied economic history. In the 1920s,
conventional wisdom held that large-scale wars were a thing of the past, and that political
stability and economic growth would replace the volatility of the years preceding World
War I. Events quickly proved the optimists wrong. By the 1980s, economists were
convinced that high commodity prices, low interest rates and reinvested oil profits
would prop up the economy forever. Before the 2008 recession, popular thinking said
globalization, better technology and sophisticated monetary policy would prevent an
economic collapse. Every time, fiscal leaders thought they had learned history’s lessons
and that this time the economy was different.
The most recent financial meltdown centered on the U.S. housing market, which regulators
allowed to inflate despite a series of cautionary red lights. In 2005 and 2006, U.S. home
price increases far outpaced growth in gross domestic product (GDP). In retrospect, home
prices were clearly in a speculative bubble. Yet, even as inflation grew, former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan argued that the econmomic situation was different.
He theorized that financial breakthroughs like widespread securitization made real estate
more liquid and supported rising prices. He waved off concerns about the massive U.S.
current account deficit. While cash from China, Japan, Germany and elsewhere flooded
into the U.S. as a safe haven, American consumers borrowed like never before.
Other influential leaders also downplayed the current account deficit. Greenspan’s
successor, Ben Bernanke, and Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill argued that high savings
rates abroad and low savings rates at home were part of the natural order. But, not
everyone was as sanguine. Nobelist Paul Krugman predicted an abrupt moment when
the foolhardiness and “unsustainability” of America’s profligate international borrowing
would become widely apparent. The trends gave reason for pause. The ratio of household
debt to GDP hit 80% in 1993, rose to 120% in 2003 and rocketed to 130% in 2006. In
this easy-money setting, lenders threw mortgages at some borrowers who couldn’t afford
homes. Subprime borrowers were trapped when their loans’ initial low rates soon soared
to unaffordable heights. The cool-handed analysis of a few high-profile contrarians like
Krugman couldn’t stop the party. This-time-is-different syndrome was in full swing from
2005 to 2007. It manifested in several beguiling arguments, which seem foolish now:
• The U.S. has the world’s largest, most sophisticated financial markets, so it can
handle massive inflows of capital.
• Developing economies will keep sending money to the U.S., which is a safe haven.
• Globalization sets the stage for higher leverage and larger debt loads.
• The U.S. has the best monetary policy institutions and policy makers.
• Innovative financial instruments unleash a solid, new demand for housing by
allowing previously untapped borrowers to take out mortgages.
In truth, the warning signals were coming through loud and clear. To see just how near
the U.S. economy came to an implosion, look at the 20th century’s “Big Five” crashes in
developed economies: Spain in 1977, Norway in 1987, Finland and Sweden in 1991, and
Japan in 1992. These meltdowns shared some common themes:
• Capital inflows predict financial crises – “Capital flow bonanzas,” as in the
U.S. in 2005, characteristically preceded the Big Five crashes and, later, the 2008
subprime meltdown.
• A wave of financial innovation often leads to crisis – The creation of new mortgagerelated mechanisms intended to reduce risk boosted the 2005-2006 housing boom.
• A housing boom often portends a financial crash – Prices can take years to
recover. After the Spanish, Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish crashes, home prices
took four to six years to hit bottom. In Japan, real estate prices remained low 17
years after the boom.
• Financial liberalization often precedes a crisis – Throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
financial crises almost inevitably followed spates of loosened financial regulation.
Strikingly, large, sophisticated financial markets are as prone to crashes as smaller,
less-advanced markets. No real differences in length or severity distinguish crashes in
less-developed nations (Indonesia, the Philippines, Argentina, Colombia) from those in
developed economies (the U.S., the U.K., Japan). This should alarm those who claim that
conditions are different in advanced markets
Se på " common themes" for finanskriser, vi lever på overtid for tidenes smell. Sprekker bobla en plass, drar det med seg finansmarkedene ned i avgrunnen. Sannsynligheten for at det snart smeller en eller annen plass nå, er OVERHENGENDE.
1 Like
Bond markedet pleier å agere før aksjemarkedet
Vixen konsoliderer over 30 - kan denne begynne å øke nå denne uken?
1 Like
Dere må virkelig slutte å sammenligne med great depression. Sentralbanken da ga 0 stimuli. Helt frie markedskrefter.
Nå i 2020 så er stimuliene så kraftige at markedet er nærmest kuppet. Welcome to the communist stock market of America!
For de bjørnene som ønsketenker om at FED nå stepper ned stimuli så anbefaler jeg at dere hører Powels tale selv. “Any means necesarry” og “agressive use of any tools”. Jeg tenker vi er i midten av konsolideringen nå før vi kjører videre.
2 Likes
Ref sitat fra Powell «Fed will do whatever it takes»
Vil ellers anbefale the investors podcast, som peker på 3 mulige scenarioer for pengetrykkingen…
1 Like
Powell har også sagt at de vil “ease of the gas pedal when the markets are at normal conditions”.
Hva vil du si er “normal market conditions” @Hild ? ATH? Høyere enn ATH? Som du ser av statsene jeg har postet i dag så har FED begynt å trappe ned kjøp.
The Fed’s balance sheet - composed of assets ranging from U.S. Treasury bonds and mortgage-backed securities to loans to banks and state governments - fell to $7.14 trillion on June 17 from $7.22 trillion a week earlier, Fed data released on Thursday showed.
Hva skjer når denne trenden fortsetter samtidig som tilfeller av CoVid-19 akselerer?
Du snakker om historieløshet @anon57124368 - det er vel ingen som påstår at aksjemarkedene ikke går opp etter et bearmarket. Er man langsiktig investor og skal sitte lenger enn de neste to årene så er det kanskje greit å kjøpe nå, hvem vet?
Faktum er likevel at hvis dette er et bullmarket, så er det det korteste bearmarkedet vi har opplevd i historien. Det vil være en unprecedented one-off. Høyst usannsynlig mao.
Anbefaler at du leser dette:
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4354018-bull-market-is-over-time-to-sell-rips-not-buy-dips
Utdrag:
The fact that the economy has suffered a major shock from an exogenous event, the likes of which we have never seen before, should warrant a cautious approach to the equity market, especially after an 11-year bull market run.
Given the possibility that a second wave of the Coronavirus will likely appear later in the coming Autumn months, if not sooner , we would suggest that a cautious approach to the stock market is warranted.
Instead, we find ourselves in a situation where reason and objective thinking have been cast aside, and replaced by the kind of totally irrational investor behavior that has preceded just about every market top in history.
This is not the time to step in front of a potential stock market train wreck just waiting to happen. The limited gains to the upside are clearly overshadowed by the potential losses to the downside.
It is not the time to buy the dips. It is time to sell the rips and accept the fact that we are no longer in a bull market. Those who subscribe to the notion that the U.S. economy will experience a “V”-shaped recovery are simply out of touch with reality.