Høyere renter hjelper mot inflasjon, men hvor høye må de være hvis inflasjon er 8%-10% og stigende?
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Det blir 1940 repeat pga «the everything bubble»
?
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om du vil ha en større forståelse for hvorfor ikke EU, og US kan sanksjonere oljen til russland uten å ødelegge sin egen økonomi, og hvorfor US ikke kan øke renten mye før de har et stort problem + mye mer snadder
🤌
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Jeg liker Luke Gromen, men har liten tro på den gullstrategien han skisserer… Det devaluerer ikke bare USD, men all Fiat, samt oljeverdien relativt til gull. Olje er primærvaren til Russland, ikke gull, så det er nok ønsketenkning. Dessuten er det to parter i en byttehandel, ikke en. Så å kreve gull blir vanskelig, om man ikke har monopol…
De har til en viss grad monopol mhp gass til Europa, men har brukt en del rubler på å bygge rør for å frakte varen, så de vil vel heller ikke at rørene står ubenyttet.
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Så du hele intervjuet ? Høres ikke sånn ut på måten du beskriver her 
Så du hele intervjuet ? Høres ikke sånn ut på måten du beskriver her Kabalen som blir lagt fram her er mye mer avansert og flere alternativer. Han nevner at han mistenker at Russland kom til å kreve kjøp av olje i rubler blant annet 2 uker før det ble annonsert i videoen her. Senere nevner han at de kanskje kom til å kjøpe gull med rubler til en fikset pris. Så langt 2 av 2 rett før det ble annonsert
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Ja
Greit det, jeg ser ikke logikken i at alt han sier vil skje fordi det skjedde? Jeg skulle ønske verden var så enkel.
Ok, jeg setter ikke alle penga mine i gull fordi han har hatt rett to ganger. Det blir litt for enkel logikk for meg.
Det jeg mener han tar litt hardt i er at Russland skal sette en høyere pris på gull relativt i forhold til olje for å få Comex papirgull til å kollapse via arbitage. De kunne gjort det på f###, men jeg ser ikke helt motivet bortsett fra evt å få opp gullprisen.
Hvorfor ikke fortsette å akkumulere først på en lavere pris? Andre land har mye mer gull enn Russland.
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Må tilbake til 2018 for å få like sterk krone som nå. Dette kan jo bli en smule interessant med tanke på rentehevinger som er planlagt framover. Spesielt euroen svekker seg mot kronen.
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Dette er halvveis en påstand og halvveis et spørsmål. Hva skjedde i 2014 som fikk euroen til å svekke seg slik mot dollaren? Det var jo i 2014 Russland tok Krim og vesten sanksjonerte Russland kraftig. Er det årsaken?
Dollar er tradisjonelt sett verdens valutaen og dit investorer går i geopolitisk uro?
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Jeg er klar over at oljeprisen falt, men når jeg sjekket så jeg ikke noe korrelasjon mellom eurusd og oljeprisen.
Da er det offisielt; bullrunet fortsetter 
Jeg hadde ikke tenkt å poste det i dag, men jeg spår en mindre nedtur fra fredag/mandag
Forutsetter ingen våpenhvile i Ukraina selvsagt. En slik våpenhvile vil gi opptur i ett par dager antar jeg.
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Where did it all go wrong? Three factors in particular stand out. The first was the impact of the slowdown in growth in China and other emerging markets, itself a response to the prospect of tighter global liquidity conditions as the U.S. Federal Reserve ended its own quantitative-easing program. The second was the impact of the Ukraine crisis and the sanctions imposed on Russia, which had a particular impact on the German economy.
These were shocks over which the eurozone had little control and which may continue to exert a drag on growth in 2015, although the impact of weaker emerging-market demand may yet be partially offset by the stimulatory boost from lower oil and commodity prices.
But the third factor in the eurozone’s weak performance in 2014 was homegrown. Structural obstacles continued to impede the rebalancing of many economies, particularly in Southern Europe, preventing capital and labor from being reallocated to where they could be more productively employed. Rigid labor and product markets have made it hard for firms to adapt to the new economic environment and have deterred new investment.
Crucially, weak insolvency regimes and inefficient judicial systems have prevented the restructuring of private-sector debts, essential to enable banks to work through their vast portfolios of nonperforming loans. Meanwhile, high levels of taxes, corruption, bureaucracy and protection for vested interests continue to discourage the supply of the new equity capital that the eurozone urgently needs to fund a new cycle of growth.
Removing these structural obstacles is crucial not only for the eurozone’s growth but also for its long-term viability—a point made by ECB President Mario Draghi in a recent speech. In a currency union that lacks automatic fiscal transfers, member states that lack the capacity to swiftly and efficiently rebalance their economy are less able to absorb shocks.
Yet the scale of reform required in some countries to enable this rebalancing amounts to a cultural revolution, a Reformation akin to the campaign to sweep away the corruption and abuses of the medieval Catholic church. What became clear in 2014 is that achieving this Reformation is proving harder than many had anticipated.
Clear signs of reform fatigue have emerged in Spain, Portugal and Greece, while in France and Italy, even relatively modest reform programs were watered down in the face of powerful opposition.
Why is reform proving so hard?
Of course, much of the problem lies with weak political structures: Even determined governments have struggled to contend with well-organized and well-funded interest groups embedded in bureaucracies, trade unions, judicial systems and the corporate sector. But a crucial factor has been the political context in which reformers have had to operate. The eurozone is increasingly paralyzed by a sterile debate focused on a supposed conflict between “austerity” and “growth.”
Those who argue that the eurozone’s core problems are structural are confronted by a simplistic Keynesian analysis that holds the eurozone’s real problem is a lack of fiscal and monetary stimulus, that its challenges are macro rather than micro, reflecting lack of demand rather than impediments to supply. Policies to eliminate wasteful spending, improve efficiency, enhance productivity and boost potential growth are dismissed as growth-sapping austerity.
The antiausterity banner has become a rallying point for resistance to all reform, reducing the political space for governments to tackle structural problems. Support for radical leftist parties is being fueled by the naive belief that if only Germany would repair its bridges or the eurozone would build more roads or the ECB would embark on quantitative easing then governments would have no need for spending cuts or reforms.
It is this deepening ideological divide which now threatens to rip the eurozone apart.
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Bra funn. Europeiske aksjer hadde et tapt tiår i perioden 2010 til 2020. Det første gode relative året fikk de i 2021.
Takker! Så usa var rett og slett mer fleksible og håndterte derfor situasjonen bedre?
Jeg har glemt hele PIIGS krisen 