Fortsatt mye russisk artilleri som blir slått ut. Russerne burde begynne å flytte mer på artilleriet sitt og bruke det mer forsiktig med tanke på motartilleriradar osv. Spørsmålet er om de gjør det.
| Dato | Artilleri | vs snitt | MRLS | vs snitt |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 02.sep | 11 | 190 % | 2 | 132 % |
| 01.sep | 24 | 414 % | 2 | 132 % |
| 31.aug | 12 | 207 % | 3 | 198 % |
| 30.aug | 19 | 327 % | 3 | 198 % |
| 29.aug | 10 | 172 % | 5 | 330 % |
| 28.aug | 5 | 86 % | 0 | 0 % |
| 27.aug | 5 | 86 % | 2 | 132 % |
| 26.aug | 3 | 52 % | 0 | 0 % |
| 25.aug | 1 | 17 % | 6 | 396 % |
| 24.aug | 3 | 52 % | 0 | 0 % |
| 23.aug | 1 | 17 % | 0 | 0 % |
Ukraina tar jo ut kommandoposter og har bedt open source intelligence om å ikke dokumentere hvor ukrainske tropper er eller dokumentere hvor Russland har mistet kontroll osv. Dette for at Russland og russiske styrker ikke skal bruke dette for å få en oversikt over situasjonen og må da basere seg på infoen de får fra sine kommandoposter som ikke nødvendigvis eksisterer, eller er på flyttefot. Dette er grunnen til at man ser lite triumferende bilder fra Ukraina for tiden.
ISW har hittil i krigen stort sett postet hva Russland driver på med og hvordan Ukraina slår angrep tilbake osv. I det siste, så har de et eget avsnitt hvor de skriver litt om hva Ukraina driver på med. Dette avsnittet begynner å bli riiimelig langt nå:
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Ukrainian military officials reiterated that Ukrainian forces continued targeting Russian logistics and reinforcements and maintained operational silence on the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine on September 1. Deputy Chief of the Ukrainian Main Operational Department Oleksiy Gromov stated that Russian losses are currently concentrated due to a series of Ukrainian missile, air, UAV, and artillery strikes on Russian command posts, positions, and ammunition depots between August 29 and August 31.[17]
The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed a pontoon bridge over the Inhulets River in Darivka, about 18km northeast of Kherson City and situated on the Kherson City-Nova Kakhovka highway.[18] Ukrainian forces have particularly targeted pontoon crossings since August 29, likely to tactically disrupt Russian forces and support ongoing Ukrainian offensive operations.[19] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command also noted that Ukrainian forces struck six ammunition depots in the Bersylavsky and Khersonsky Raions (Districts) in Central Kherson Oblast, and Hennichensky Raion, near the eastern Kherson Oblast-Crimea border.[20] Ukrainian forces also reportedly destroyed command posts of the Russian 331st Guards Airborne Regiment of the 98th Guards Airborne Division and the 56th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault Division in unspecified areas.[21] The 331st Regiment previously operated near Hostomel, Kyiv Oblast, in February and March and suffered significant losses, and Ukrainian military officials stated that Ukrainian forces previously struck the unit’s command post south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border in Novovoskresenke on August 23.[22] It is unclear if Ukrainian forces struck the 331st Regiment’s command post in Novovoskresenke or another location.
Ukrainian forces likely continued to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) and key positions throughout central Kherson Oblast on September 1. Local Ukrainian civilians reported hearing explosions and witnessing active air defense systems in Nova Kakhovka and Kakhovka (approximately 12km northeast of Nova Kakhovka), and social media footage showed new Ukrainian strikes against the Antonivsky Bridge.[23] The Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Russian forces shot down Ukrainian AGM-88 HARM missiles over Antonivsky Bridge.[24] A Ukrainian Telegram channel reported that a Ukrainian missile hit an unspecified target in Oleshky (about 9km southeast of Kherson City on the left bank of the Dnipro River), and that Russian air defense systems shot down a Ukrainian missile over Kalanchak (about 67km due south of Kherson City).[25] A Ukrainian Telegram channel also published footage of a reported destroyed Russian military base in Shyroka Balka, about 35km west of Kherson City.[26] Geolocated footage also showed the destruction of a Russian military base in the former barracks of the Ukrainian National Guards in Kherson City, likely destroyed during a Ukrainian strike on August 29.[27] Ukrainian Telegram channels have also reported Russian forces transporting more barges to Nova Kakhovka, likely in an attempt to facilitate cross-river transportation in the area.[28]
Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces continued attacking in at least four directions in Kherson Oblast, but these claims remain largely unverifiable. Various milbloggers claimed that fighting continued west of Vysokopillya south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border, east and northeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, around Snihurivka about 65km east of Mykolaiv City, and north of Kherson City.
Some milbloggers reported that Russian airborne troops repelled Ukrainian attacks on Olhyne, while others noted that Russian forces have “confident control” over the southern halves of Olhyne and Vysokopillya and are engaged in defensive battles south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border.[29] Ukrainian forces reportedly continued fighting in Arkhanhelske near the Inhulets River in the northernmost part of Kherson Oblast.[30] Some Russian milbloggers reported that Russian forces established partial control of Bila Krynytsia (between the Ukrainian bridgehead and Davydiv Brid), while others claimed that Rosgvadia and Russian airborne troops are fighting Ukrainian forces in Davydiv Brid itself.[31] Geolocated footage also showed Russian forces striking Ukrainian military equipment south of Bila Krynytsia.[32] A milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces captured Kostromka (10km southeast of the Ukrainian bridgehead) and advanced to the outskirts of Bruskynske on the T2207 highway, while simultaneously attacking Shchaslyve south of Kostromka.[33] Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) officials and milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack on Snihurivka, and geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces shelling Russian positions in the settlement.[34] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces regained control over Zeleny Hai (approximately 23km north of Kherson City) and noted that Russian forces continued to fire at Ukrainian positions with artillery.[35] Geolocated footage showed Russian artillery shelling Ukrainian forces near Myrne (approximately seven kilometers west of Zeleny Hai), and Russian milbloggers previously stated that Russian forces failed to advance to Myrne on August 31.[36] Geolocated footage also showed a destroyed Ukrainian tank in Liubomyrivka (about 7km north of Zeleny Hai), which corroborates Russian milbloggers’ claims from August 31 of Ukrainian advances in the area.[37] Geolocated footage seemingly shows five Russian soldiers surrendering to Ukrainian forces in Pravdyne (about 35km northwest of Kherson City).[38]
The Russian Defense Ministry claimed it destroyed Ukrainian ammunition depots on the western bank of the Inhulets River.[39] The Kherson Oblast Occupation Police also claimed it neutralized a Ukrainian “terrorist” headquarters in Kherson City.[40]
Ref: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-1
Skal USA og Vesten gi etter for trusler her ? Ikke på tale sett hardt mot hardt. Om putin setter atomvåpnene i beredskap så gjør det samme i USA,Frankrike,Tyskland,Storbritania,Tyrkia .
Tydelig mangel på kanonføde for russerene.
De ser ut til å holde trykket oppe. Både på artilleri og øvrig. 5 på “cruise missiles” er også uvanlig høyt.
Får jo håpe ikke mange aksepterer dette. Lokalkunnskap er jo en del verdt så kan fort ha en verdi for de russiske troppene om de får vervet en del slike.
Hvorfor skulle de ikke akseptere det? De kjemper jo for å bli uavhengig av Ukraina.
Mye mlrs, bare litt over snittet med artilleri. Godt over snittet på APC og tanks.
As of August 2021, Russia’s defence minister stated the country had about 170 BTGs. Each BTG has approximately 600–800 officers and soldiers, of whom roughly 200 are infantrymen, equipped with vehicles typically including roughly 10 tanks and 40 infantry fighting vehicles.
Alle APC-ene til en hel BTG og tanks til to og en halv BTG. Antall døde sårede tilsvarende en hel BTG. Antagelsen går på at Russland har så dårlig håndtering av skadede at de bare 1,5 ganger så mange sårede som døde. Ukraina har 4 ganger så mange og USA 7.
Jeg håper de ikke aksepterer det. Og langt ifra sikkert alle som har akseptert russisk pass ønsker å kjempe for russerne. Kan være mange grunner til å akseptere pass. Frykten for hva som kan skje om man ikke gjør det bla.
Den russiske støtten blant ukrainerne har vel vist seg å være heller lav. Russerne brente seg jo egentlig veldig på feilberegning av det i starten.
