Hej Norge
Ruskiiiiies har fået Bøllebank på Kopiansk fronten — 1000 soldater, 55 Tanks og BMPs tilintetgjort eller gjort ukampdygtige i et slag 
Og Denys 
Vældig god up-date fra diverse medier 
Dagens Pollental
Slava Ukraini 
Dansken
Det fremstilles i videon som at tapen var førgæves. Men fra et ruzziskt perspektiv var det ikke det. Det dog en masse ukrainare også. + at det gikk åt en masse utstyr før Ukraina. Så ur ruzziskt perspektiv var det ikke noen førlust.
Så, fordi Ukraina angrep Kursk, så kunne de lettere ta tilbake områder fra russerne uten å gå head-on. For meg høres det ut som et lurt grep. I tillegg, så har Ukraina fått frigjort flere hundre krigsfanger som har vært fanget siden 2022. Russerne fikk vernepliktige som Ukraina tok til fange i Kursk.
https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1840969465929912715
Russerne vs Ukrainske tap av “panser”:
Artilleri 5 vs 3
Tanks 16 vs 2
IFV 11 vs 0
APC 11 vs 2
MRAP 0 vs 4
Totalt 43 vs 11
Ukraina mister forholdsmessig mer sivile biler, mens russerne mister flere lastebiler.
Har du tall på ukrainske tap fra dette slaget?
Etter videoen å dømme, foregikk den ukrainske innsatsen i hovedsak med droner før kolonnene kom fram.
Han kommenterer innlegget som snakket om 1000 tapte tanks. Det er ikke ett angrep.
Russerne tar terreng, men taper ekstreme mengder utstyr og soldater.
Juli
Nå
Btw, Vuhledar har vel i praksis falt. Det øverste flaggsymbolet på kartet der er noe russere med et flagg.
De ødela jo mye FPV-droner og artelleri skudd
Noen må det ju ha gått åt. Før meg så er en en før mange. Men ikke før ryssen.
Og det gikk åt mange droner da, så det er noe som ruskisene ser som positivt.
Tauet artilleri på lager i Russland.
Kategorien “Large” er jo interessant, er ikke akkurat masse igjen der? På den andre siden, de har selvgående artilleri i tillegg, men det er tyngre å få kjørende igjen.
Et spennende kappløp; Rekker Russland å gå tom for kanoner før økonomien knekker sammen?
De går kanske tom for Ammunition inden – se Video link
https://www.reddit.com/r/UkraineWarVideoReport/comments/1ftkd5a/russian_military_started_complaining_about_shell/
Dk
https://x.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1841199422006231289
Ukrainian ballistic missile has passed flight tests successfully - President Zelenskyy at the International Defense Industries Forum
Store russiske ammolagre innen 500 km av Ukraina snart historie?
Man blir jo så sint og samtidig utslitt av å følge med på denne forferdelige krigen, så mye grusomt har skjedd allerede at man blir litt avstumpet. Og her er enda en ny krigsforbrytelse som burde være hovedoppslag over alt, men neppe kommer til å skape noen ny debatt om økt støtte til Ukraina 
Jeg klarer ikke å se på all ondskapen Russland utfører, jeg hadde endt opp med PTSD. Jeg følger derfor først og fremst med på det militære. Jeg vet nok til at de som sier at Ukraina bare burde gjøre en fredsavtale med Russland ikke forstår hva slags regime de som er igjen i de okkuperte områdene må leve med.
De skjønner heller ikke at en fredsavtale rundt de linjene som er nå vil gi seieren til Russland og la dem starte opp på nytt igjen om 4-10 år. Russland har angrepet Tjetsjenia to ganger, Georgia en gang og Ukraina to ganger.
Russland kommer ikke til å slutte før de blir stoppet. En fredsavtale med dem på deres vilkår er bare en oppmuntring til at de om at de kan starte krigen på nytt om noen år.
Joda, det forstår de godt. Og de liker den.
Hej Norge
Dagens Up-date 
Tiden er ved at rende ud for offensiv grundet oktober muddersæson – var det ikke “Rsapuski” det bliver kaldt.
Pokrovsk bliver svær at indtage for Ruskiiiiies
Og Denys --med dårlige nyheder 
Dagens Pollental
Slava Ukraini
Dansken
Om Vuhledar: x.com
Russia has attacked Vuhledar several times over the past two years, but this current attack began on September 25th, 2023, when Russia launched its full-scale attack on Novomykhailivka. Ukraine fended off the attack for nearly 7 months but ultimately lost the town on April 21st, almost entirely due to airstrikes that annihilated it. During the assault on Novomykhailivka, which Russia saw as one of its primary objectives last winter, Ukraine destroyed well over 300 Russian vehicles during the primary assault and probably another 300 during secondary and tertiary assaults.
Next came the battle for Kostyantynivka, which lasted several more months before Russia managed to break into the middle of the village. Ukraine ultimately decided to withdraw from its defense of the western part of the town on August 27th, and this withdrawal, I believe, was the beginning of the end for Vuhledar. It started a chain reaction.
During the battle for Kostyantynivka, Russia began to push toward Vodiane. They made it near the highway by the time Ukraine retreated from Kostyantynivka, but almost a week before Ukraine left Kostyantynivka, Russia managed to capture the trench line defending the highway. These events were so close in time that they were not a coincidence. I think either Ukraine decided to withdraw from the highway because of Kostyantynivka or they decided to withdraw from Kostyantynivka because of the highway. I don’t know which.
Regardless, also running concurrently with the primary assaults on Kostyantynivka, Russia began a massive air campaign on Prechystivka. I tried to raise alarm bells on this several times; it was highly concerning and reminded me of their behavior in Novomykhailivka. After many months of near-continuous airstrikes, Russia launched a large and pretty sudden assault on the town beginning on August 26th, capturing it on September 3rd, ultimately collapsing the western flank of Vuhledar and pushing across the Kashlahach River in multiple places with large numbers of troops in each instance.
Losing Kostyantynivka and the highway near Vodiane made defending Vuhledar extremely questionable; losing these river crossings made it practically impossible. The fact that all three occurred within 17 days, after many months of preparation and planning, shows how coordinated the attack on Vuhledar was.
Then came the capture of Vodiane itself (around September 8th,9th,10th) and, quickly after that, the capture or partial capture of both mines (September 9th and 15th) near Vuhledar, thus completing a near encirclement that ended any prospect for the defense of the city. And, of course, Russia captured Vuhledar on October 1st.
This well-planned, multiphase attack on Vuhledar lasted roughly 1 year + 1 week. During this time, Russia implemented new (for them) ideas for breaking through Ukrainian defenses, iterated on those ideas, and learned from its mistakes. I expect them to follow this same basic format going forward, with further iterations designed to reduce their casualties and losses.
Russia cannot survive more Novomykhailivkas, but they can do Prechystivkas forever. And that is a real problem.
AndrewPerpetua og teamet hans ser på flere hundre videoer hver dag og geolocater hvor evt tap har skjedd. Tenker han har en bedre oversikt over hvordan ting faktisk skjer enn 99,999% av alle som følger med på krigen og som ikke sitter i det ukrainske hovedkvarteret.
Lessons for Ukraine:
ATGMs are extremely vital for defense. You need ATGMs and positions to fire them from. In order to fire, you need to be above the ground, you often see them inside houses, on roofs, etc. But these positions are easy targets for guided missiles and guided bombs. Maybe Ukraine should be building more defensive structures like the anthill: large earth structures. You saw similar defensive positions north of Novomykhailivka, and those positions, even with air support, could not be captured by Russia. Russia had to outflank them and force Ukraine to abandon them.
Constructing large earth structures, lined with concrete, could resist Russian airpower, enable you to take advantage of ATGMs, and offer strong points capable of withstanding determined Russian assaults.
Road construction is vital. You need to get supplies to the front, especially to well defended areas that are under attack. The anthill, for example, was not lost due to its destruction or being overwhelming with Russian power. It was lost because the road supplying it was destroyed, and the casualties from resupply and troop rotation became so high people refused to do it anymore.
I believe Ukraine has the knowledge and resources to build defenses that are capable of standing up to Russian airpower, and they have done so in the past. But they need to begin doing it again. The defensive line that was build in 2014, 2015, 2016 is gone. They have to make a new one, of similar or greater quality. Learning from the mistakes made with the first, and iterating on the successes.
Also, all of Ukraine’s most successful defensive positions were not along tree lines. They were in the middle of a field, using manmade positions in the middle, not natural defensive barriers. You need bunkers that are deep enough to survive airstrikes, strong enough to resist collapse, and large enough to safely keep enough men to defend the position. You need to build up off the ground, not merely dig trenches, but to get up so you can see the enemy approaching. And then, in that higher position, dig trenches and bunkers. On anthill, for example, they first dug down to build a bunker, they piled earth above the bunker to be meters tall, and then dug trenches into that earth. So you had trenches several meters above ground on top of a bunker. This sort of earthen defensive structure, lined with concrete, has proven to be very effective. Much more effective than simple trench systems.
Problemet jeg ser med det AndrewPerpetua skriver her er hvordan de fungerer mot 1500kg glidebomber. Hvis de ikke fungerer mot dem, så har man gjort veldig mye arbeid til ingen nytte.
Jeg tenker at for at krigen skal kunne svinges i ukrainsk favør, så må de få luftvern. Enten bakkebasert, eller flybasert, som kan stoppe russerne fra å bruke svært billige glidebomber.
Ukraina må også gå hardere på jernbanelogistikken til Russland. Dette innebærer å ta ut strømforsyningen til jernbaneknutepunkt, selv om pumping av russisk råolje blir skadelidende. For en raskere slutt på krigen, kan ikkeUkraina ta hensyn til råoljeprisen.
Nok et selvmord eller ???
Der er noget der virker
DK
Ukrainske soldater vil det samme som oss, de vil leve!
De ønsker ikke å være kanonføde i en tapt krig.
Over 60 000 ukrainske soldater har rømt fra fronten siden 2022, melder** Kyiv Post . Nesten halvparten av tilfellene som er registrert av den ukrainske riksadvokaten, har skjedd i år.
