To muligheter for SPY de kommende dagene. Enten sÄ tar vi i mot pÄ trendlinja ellers er neste stÞttenivÄ rundt 255
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@Christian du er vell makrospesialist vil jeg tro⊠Hvortid er det vi skal kjÞpe shanghai bÞrsen? spÞr for en venn
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Nope! 
Aner ikke 
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Fra ifjor. HĂ„per Ă„rets kommer ut snart.
" Today, half of all borrowers put down 5% or less. More than 10% of borrowers put 0% down. As a result, the average loan-to-value ratio at origination has climbed to 87%."
Rentene har steget veldig kjapt pÄ kort tid og vil nok fortsette opp.
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Hva menes her med ânonbank lendersâ, hvem lĂ„ner disse fra?
Her stÄr endel informasjon! Hadde tenkt svare mer utdypende, men jeg mÄ dessverre lÞpe!
Aldri, siden myndighetene har for vane Ă„ forby salg av aksjer hvis nedgangen fĂžles litt ubehagelig.
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Hva er tanken bak en over 3 Ă„r gamle artikkel ?
Var et eksempel pĂ„ hva jeg mente med: âsiden myndighetene har for vane Ă„ forby salg av aksjer hvis nedgangen fĂžles litt ubehagelig.â
Aha, sÄg det nÄ. Kikke bare inn pÄ artikkelen ut Ä lese posten i forkant. Litt lat dag⊠Sorry 
Ser du for deg at @kaei kommer til Ä eie mer enn 5% av noen av selskapene pÄ shanghai bÞrsen?
Om han kjÞper indeksen sÄ er det ingen som kommer til Ä hindre han i Ä selge.
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Myndighetene i Kina gjĂžr som de vil. Ănsker noen Ă„ putte sparepengene sine i hendene pĂ„ noen som som har null respekt for privat eiendomsrett, sĂ„ skal ikke jeg stoppe dem. Lykke til.
Dette er noe av det som er mest alvorlig.
âMost nonbanks also do not have access to the government institutions, such as the Federal Reserve System or the Federal Home Loan Bank System, that provide short-term credit to depository institutions with liquidity needs. Meanwhile, the regulatory infrastructure for monitoring nonbanks for safety and soundness is less well-developed than the equivalent infrastructure for banks, and data on the financial condition of nonbanks are less standardized and are not widely available.â
NÄr banker gÄr skeis sÄ er det svÊrt enkelt for myndighetene Ä tilfÞre likviditet og evt baile out hele selskapet. Det er mye vanskeligere med nonbanks.
Samtidig er altsÄ myndighetenes innsikt i desse bedriftene mye dÄrligere enn hos bankene. SÄ de har ikke god kontroll og oversikt over hvor stor risikoen faktisk er.
"In particular, nonbanks are dependent on short-term credit to finance their operations, and this credit can become more expensive, or dry up entirely, when financial market conditions tighten. The business model of some nonbanks relies on mortgage refinancing; this revenue tends to diminish when interest rates rise. Nonbanks also, on average, service mortgages with a higher probability of default, so they are exposed to greater credit losses when house prices decline. As we describe in the paper, nonbank lenders that primarily originate mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans Affairs are particularly vulnerable to these strains.
Nonbank mortgage companies were hit hard during the financial crisis and many went out of business. The total number of mortgage companies (both independent and affiliated with banks) fell in half from 2006 to 2012âa drop of nearly 1,000 companies."
SÄ desse selskapene er ogsÄ de som gir mest av desse lÄnene med 0-5% egenkapital! De tar hÞyest risiko og er mer utsatt.
Som det stÄr her gikk en hel hau konkurs sist finanskrise, men da hadde de en mye mindre andel av markedet. Det har gÄtt fra 20 prosent i 2007 til over 60% i dag!
USA har jo vĂŠrt sĂ„ snille de har âBacketâ svĂŠrt mange av desse lĂ„nene sĂ„ derfor har de sĂ„ dĂ„rlige krav.
Selskapene vil jo likevel fÄ problemer og risikere gÄ konkurs, mens staten vil gÄ pÄ enorme tap. Desse huseierne har jo omtrent ingen egenkapital, nÄr prisene da gÄr ned og de er under vann. Vil de slutte Ä betale og vente pÄ Ä bli kastet ut. SÄ vi snakker om enorme tap. Da baller jo det pÄ seg, nÄr nonbanks fÄr trÞbbel strammer kreditt markedet seg inn helt enormt og vi vet jo at selv bankene vil ikke strekke til. Selv etter finanskrisen nÄr de fikk flere trillion $ orket de Ä lÄne ut pengene, de turte ikke og tok heller i mot renten fra FED. Dermed tok nonbanks pÄ seg rollen/risikoen.
"Whatâs more, these non-banks tend to originate mortgages that are less sound â less likely to be repaid â to minority and low-income borrowers. Those borrowers are likelier to be vulnerable to delinquencies triggered by economic shocks like a fall in house prices, according to the authors.
In 2016, 64% of the mortgages originated by non-banks were for black and Hispanic borrowers, and 58% went to low- or moderate-income borrowers."
" During the housing bust, nonbank lenders failed in droves as home prices fell and borrowers stopped making payments, fueling a wider financial crisis. Yet when banks dramatically cut back home loans after the crisis, it was nonbank mortgage companies that stepped into the breach. Now, nonbanks are a larger force in residential lending than ever. In 2016, they accounted for half of all mortgages, up from 20 percent in 2007, the Brookings Institution paper notes. Their share of mortgages with explicit government backing is even higher: nonbanks originate about 75 percent of loans guaranteed by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).
Nonbank lenders are regulated by a patchwork of state and federal agencies that lack the resources to watch over them adequately, so risk can easily build up without a check. While the Federal Reserve lends money to banks in a pinch, it does not do the same for independent mortgage companies.
Scant access to cash
In stark contrast with banks, independent mortgage companies have little capital of their own and scant access to cash in an emergency. They have come to rely on a type of short-term funding known as warehouse lines of credit, usually provided by larger commercial and investments banks. Itâs a murky area since most nonbank lenders are private companies which are not required to disclose their financial structures, so Stanton and Wallaceâs paper provides the first public tabulation of the scale of this warehouse lending. They calculated that there was a $34 billion commitment on warehouse loans at the end of 2016, up from $17 billion at the end of 2013. That translates to about $1 trillion in short-term âwarehouse loansâ funded over the course of a year.
If rising interest rates were to choke off the mortgage refinance market, if an economic slowdown prompted more homeowners to default, or if the banks that extend credit to mortgage lenders cut them off, many of these companies would find themselves in trouble with no way out. âThere is great fragility. These lenders could disappear from the map,â Stanton notes."
Veldig fint opplegg fÄr bankene. De solgte dritt lÄnene sine til FED og har i ettertid kun lÄnt ut penger til de beste kundene selv. SÄ tjener de heller penger pÄ Ä lÄne penger til nonbanks som tar risikoen selv 
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Hvordan var omsetningen i dag?