Formålet er fortsatt å jakte atomubåter. Langt fra land. Pr nå finnes det ikke bedre verktøy for den jobben.
Jada, vi vet det.
Spørsmålet er hvordan et såpass saftig mål vil klare seg i en moderne strid.
Pdd har man klart å føre droner helt frem til fregattene i Fridtjof Nansen - klassen uten at fartøyene klarerer å oppdage dronene.
Så svaret på spørsmålet om vi bygger et relevant forsvar for fremtidens slagmark er at det høyst usikkert.
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Det blir litt som når Kina ga Iran sine Carrier killer raketter. Som ble avfyrt i stort monn, uten å ta ut noen amerikanske carriers.
Utviklingen går for fult på alle fronter. Droner blir bedre, anti drone blir bedre.
For å jakte ubåter brukes det fly, sensorer på havbunnen, ubåter, helikopter og fregatter. Samspillet mellom de er viktig og fregattene er kanskje de som er viktigst mtp å senke ubåter. Likevel er det er betimelig spørsmål om det er lurt å bruke 150 milliarder på nye fregatter gitt utviklingen med droner.
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Enn så lenge så er det lite utvikling på droner som kan jage, finne og senke ubåter.
Desuten vil fregatten kunne være en meget bra platform å sende droner fra.
Hovedproblemet med droner er at utviklingen skjer så ekstremt fort at dersom vi bruker masse penger på å kjøpe droner nå, så er de utdaterte om et år.
Ukraina har pratet mye om dette, hvor ekstremt fort utviklingen går.
Poenget med droner er å bygge egen kapasitet til produksjon og utvikling. Selve dronene må være så billig at de er forbruksvarer, og produksjonsteknologien må kunne skaleres ekstremt godt. Man kjøper med andre ord ikke droner - man bygger kapasitet til å kunne anvende og masseprodusere den til en hver tid nyeste teknologien.
Billig- og i store mengder er en tankegang som er fundamentalt annerledes enn så og si all vestlig våpenutvikling de siste 50 årene. Jeg er på mange måter mer bekymret for at vi ikke evner å endre tankegang, enn for de teknologiske utfordringene.
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Der har vi jo hedget ved å finansiere Ukraina.
Jeg ser det ikke som realistisk at Norge skal ha egen produksjon, men at vi kan kjøpe tech og droner av Ukraina er jo god deal.
Og der føler jeg vi har gjort alt riktig.
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Hvordan kan du vite at Ukraina vil være vår venn og alliert hvis vi brått skulle trenge det?
Ting kan snu rimelig kjapt
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Som også er problemet for, nettopp, fregatter og annet utstyr…. 
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I en organisasjon snakkes det gjerne om absorbtiv kapasitet. Det betyr i praksis evnen til å identifisere og ta opp ny kunnskap i èn del av organisasjonen, gjøre kunnskapen intern og så utnytte den kommersielt i en annen del av organisasjonen.
Det er den absorbtive kapasiteten til det norske forsvaret som jeg i bunn og grunn er bekymret for.
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At forsvaret er blitt sterkt byråkratisert er det absolutt ingen tvil om. Samme syken som resten av staten.
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Verdt å få med seg hva Russiske Rybar sier nå.
https://x.com/clement_molin/status/2058987013034889572?s=20
The situation in Russia’s southern regions is becoming increasingly threatening. Since early May, Ukrainian forces have significantly increased the number of drone strikes against vehicles transporting various goods to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions and Crimea. There is a risk of shortages of certain goods on the peninsula, and fuel sales are restricted.
The threat is not only the disruption of the Crimean holiday season or the shortage of certain products on the peninsula. Strikes against cargo carriers on the peninsula directly impact the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces on the southern fronts, where the situation is already precarious.
The enemy has been attacking the Kamenskoye area for a long time and has managed to advance in several areas, pushing back Russian forces: Stepnogorsk and Plavni have been nearly lost, along with virtually all territorial gains made by the Russian Armed Forces during the offensive that began in early 2025.
There is a risk that the enemy will not only restore the status quo but also launch an offensive along the Kamenskoye-Shcherbaki line. Indirect signs indicate that the problems in this area have been addressed, but the situation remains difficult.
Ukrainian drone operators have significantly increased their activity in strikes against Kamenka-Dniprovska, Vodyane, and Enerhodar. Every 20-30 minutes, local public groups report dozens of drone attacks on the city. There have been casualties among the local population. Employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant are also becoming targets, as officially reported by the company’s resources.
This may indicate that the enemy is preparing, if not a full-scale landing, then a diversionary strike through the reeds at the bottom of the former Kakhovka Reservoir.
The loss of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant cannot be allowed: dislodging even small enemy forces from there will be an extremely difficult task. Moreover, the Russian Armed Forces will be severely limited in their means of destruction, as the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant is not a target worth targeting with airstrikes.
Considering that Ukrainian forces have already partially paralyzed the logistics of southern Russia in the land corridor to Crimea, it is not difficult to imagine what will happen if the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to breach the Russian Armed Forces’ defenses along the Kamenskoye-Shcherbaki line.
The Russian Armed Forces will have to deploy reinforcements along the route to Vasilyevka, the roads to which are already under frequent enemy attack. In the worst-case scenario, stabilizing the situation will require the deployment of additional forces via routes such as Tokmak and the more distant Berdyansk and Mariupol. Even the delivery of civilian cargo along these routes is already severely disrupted.
What can be done about this? The issue of organizing a “small sky” air defense system is clear and has been studied. It has also been discussed at the highest levels. The exponential increase in attacks after the May holidays is obvious, even though the roads were unsafe even before. Just in time for the beginning of May, the Ukrainian Armed Forces tested Hornets, and after the ceasefire, they began massive use, giving no respite to develop countermeasures.
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Skyter inn at nå ikveld skal UKR ha avfyrt Strorm Shadow mot RUS’ infrastruktur.
Russisk kommandosentral og kommunikasjonspost i Luhansk skal være ødelagt.
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ISW om samme tematikk
https://x.com/georgewbarros/status/2058899241284620653?s=20
We’re calling it: The war in Ukraine has entered a new phase.
@KatStepanenko
and I have authored a new special report studying how Ukraine is actively challenging the positional character of the war that has dominated the battlefield since 2023.
Data on Russia’s battlefield performance indicates that the character of the war is shifting in favor of Ukrainian forces – at least for now. Russian forces rates of advances are stagnating while Ukrainian forces are employing novel tactics and operational concepts in efforts to break out of positional warfare. Neither Russia nor Ukraine can conduct operational maneuvers yet, however.
The bottom line is that the war in Ukraine is competitive and far from stalemated. Ukrainian forces are out-innovating Russian forces in both military technologies and in applying these new technologies in effective operational concepts that can help Ukrainian forces break out of positional warfare. Ukraine is employing mechanized equipment in tactical maneuvers in ways that were impossible 12 months ago. Russia’s ability to conduct infiltration missions will likely continue to degrade as Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign pushes Russia’s logistics and forward operating bases further away from the frontlines, reducing resourcing to sustain infantry tasked with infiltration missions. Ukraine may be able to scale these effects if they resourced properly by international partners.
Ukraine’s advantage in intermediate range strikes is notably not permanent, and Russia will very likely eventually develop countermeasures to mitigate Ukraine’s advantages. Ukraine’s international partners thus have a rare and temporary opportunity to help Ukraine exploit favorable battlefield dynamics while Ukraine has the upper hand.
Key Points of the report:
• Russia’s rate of advance is plummeting during the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.
• Russia is losing more soldiers to make fewer gains, with monthly Russian casualty rates reportedly outpacing monthly recruitment since December 2025.
• Ukraine is starting to regain more ground than it is losing for the first time since 2023.
• Ukraine’ recent counterattacks feature unique characteristics and deviate from key trends that defined the positional character of the war since 2023.
• Ukraine is conducting a pattern of more frequent mechanized counterattacks at the tactical level for the first time since 2023.
• The Ukrainian command’s operational planning is maturing.
• Ukraine’s early 2026 counterattacks in the south were successful likely due to better planning and preparation of the battlefield.
• Ukraine has been conducting a coherent campaign to suppress and destroy Russian air defenses since late 2025, in order to shape the battlefield as part of more sophisticated campaign planning.
• Ukraine significantly intensified its intermediate-range strike campaign against dynamic targets in Spring 2026 in order to degrade Russian logistics at operational depths ahead of planned Ukrainian maneuver.
• Ukrainian forces started actively disrupting Russian railway logistics in occupied Ukraine and Russian western regions in Spring 2026.
• Ukrainian intermediate-range strikes are already achieving notable operational effects, including degrading Russia’s ability to use the key Russian highway connecting Russia to occupied Crimea and GLOCs around Donetsk City.
• Ukrainian forces decisively seized the initiative in intermediate-range strikes by fielding new technologies such as the US-made Hornet strike UAV, among other systems.
• Ukrainian forces are achieving temporary tactical drone overmatch in some frontline sectors, which is slowing Russian offensive operations by degrading the effectiveness of Russian shaping operations.
• Ukrainian forces likely achieved tactical drone overmatch in certain frontline sectors after degrading Russia’s drone capabilities in late 2025 to early 2026 - primarily by suppressing drone launch positions and increasingly intercepting Russian tactical UAVs.
• Ukraine’s degradation of Russian forces at operational depth combined with tactical-level drone overmatch likely is creating vulnerabilities in the Russian lines.
• Ukraine’s intermediate-range strike campaign is likely far from its zenith, assuming continued support from Ukraine’s partners, and will likely intensify over 2026 as Ukraine fields new weapons capable of striking Russian’s operational rear.
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Jeg leser: Russland planlegger en false flag operasjon nær atomkraftverket.
Spørsmålet er jo hvor stort vinduet er før Russland begynner å bruke interceptor-droner i stor skala. Det er jo eneste logiske utviklingen fra Russland sin side? 
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Det er godt spørsmål, samtidig klarer ikke russland det uten hjelp fra Kina.
Ooog Xi og Trump var ikke direkte fiender under toppmøtet.
så vi får se.
Vil tro Kina ønsker å få testet egen interceptor drone tech. Hvor er det bedre å teste den?
Det er godt poeng. Samtidig har kina et evig behov for å få solgt varene sine.
Russia is preparing to declare mobilization, Russians have begun to be issued “mobilization orders” en masse, — The Moscow Times
A mobilization order is issued at military registration and enlistment offices, where Russians liable for military service are summoned ostensibly to “clarify data”.
This document contains instructions on what a citizen should do in the event of a mobilization announcement: where and when to appear, what to take with them.
A representative of one of the military registration and enlistment offices, in a conversation with the publication, called this “preparation for general mobilization”.
Betyr at RUS ila 3-6måneder kanskje raskere kan ha klart å tette hullet med mer døde enn nye rekrutter.
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